Gaining international clout is an important motivation in pursuing monetary integration, as small country merge into a larger entity that can project more global power. We provide evidence to that effect using survey data from Kenya pertaining to public support for the proposed East African Monetary Union. We show that Kenyans prefer a larger union with more members for the purpose of gaining global clout. However, not all potential member countries are equally welcomed. Larger and more stable countries are favored over fragile states.
I. Introduction
While there are several compelling reasons for regional integration, this study argues that gaining international clout is a key reason why countries pursue regional integration. Whalley (1998) points out that European countries started to integrate in the 1950s partly to gain leverage in trade negotiations with the United States, with similar objectives being pursued later by Mercosur. Masson (2006) makes a similar argument for the East African Community (EAC). The European Commission (2014) writes that, "the euro provides a powerful tangible symbol of unity, identity and cooperation," thus "giving Europe a stronger voice and more economic clout in global trade." Andriamananjara and Schiff (2001) and Schiff (2014) formalize these ideas in models where countries join in regional blocs to lower external negotiation costs and to gain international bargaining power.
However, this study does not offer direct empirical evidence that gaining international clout is a motivating factor in the pursuit of regional integration.
We provide such evidence using unique survey data from Kenya, which is in the process of joining into a monetary union with the other members of the East African Community. Specifically, we show that Kenyans recognize that a monetary union could raise the international standing of Kenya and that these expectations enhance public support for the union. On the other hand, we also show that people do not equally favor all other potential associates. Specifically, while a larger union is preferred given the objective of international power, adding smaller or more fragile states is less desirable.
We build upon a large body of literature on the economic and political factors underlying monetary unions that includes Feldstein (1997), Frankel and Rose (1998) , Rose and Van Wincoop (2001) , De Grauwe (2013) , and Orphanides (2014) , among others. Our contribution is to explore the effect of gaining international power on public support for a monetary union. We also contribute to the studies investigating the optimal size of monetary unions, for example, Maloney and Macmillen (1999) and Forlati (2015) , by providing Vol.33 No.2, June, 2018 , 1363~1387 Menna Bizuneh, Steven Buigut and Neven Valev http://dx.doi.org/10.11130/jei.2018 .33.2.1363 jei Gaining global clout through monetary union : Evidence from East Africa jei evidence that larger unions are preferred but not all potential members are equally welcomed. To our knowledge, no other study has presented evidence on the public preferences over specific countries to be included in a proposed monetary union. Further, we provide micro level data within a literature that typically approached the question of monetary unification at the macro-level. and Blomberg et al. (2005) show that attitudes and preferences over currency policy vary across social groups. The survey data allow us to observe those differences. We can also analyze attitudes toward a policy change in advance of its implementation and, hence, shed light on its potential actual implementation. Finally, we contribute to a relatively scant study on the East African Community and its proposed monetary union (Buigut 2010 , Kimenyi and Kuhlman 2012 , Lepetit et al. 2015 , Nnyanzi et al. 2016 , Buigut 2016 .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the EAC and section III presents the data. In sections IV and V, we discuss our methodology and the estimation results. Section VI concludes.
II. The East African Community
The East African Community (EAC) currently comprises six member countries-Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, and South Sudanwith an estimated population of 174. (Goldstein and Ndung'u 2001, Hazlewood 1979 Besides forging a deeper and less easily revocable union, the EAMU is expected to lower transaction costs, to help price stabilization, to improve resource allocation across the region, to lead to greater trade integration, and to improve the prospects for greater investment. Several studies Valev 2009, Guillaume and Stasavage 2000) have argued that regional African monetary unions can act as an agent of restraint and deliver more price stability than national central banks. A larger and more cohesive economic bloc may also provide a stronger voice and more economic clout in global negotiations. Negotiating as a monetary bloc in global trade issues (for example, the EU-EAC economic partnership agreement recently concluded in 2014) gives it better chances of achieving more favorable deals than when small states act individually. Also, complexity from trade negotiations requires high level of expertise that could be enhanced via regional cooperation, through cost savings and human resource pooling.
Vis-à-vis the EAC, there are two things to note in our survey. First, South
Sudan is not included in the study as it was not yet a full member of the union when the survey was undertaken and was therefore not included. Second, preference for inclusion is viewed from the perspective of Kenyan respondents. (Table 1) . Thus, from an economic perspective, respondents are likely to be swayed in favor of the two countries with which they are more economically integrated. The two countries also bring more in terms of external recognition, as they are the dominant economies in the community, in terms of both GDP and population, alongside with Kenya. 
III. Data
The survey contains responses from 509 individuals, and the sample's The respondents were then asked to indicate as many countries as they would like included in the EAMU. Table 2 summarizes the responses to Statement 1: 23.2 percent of the respondents do not support a monetary union while 37.9 percent prefer a partial union of select countries. Of these, 6.5 percent picked one other country to join Kenya in an EAMU, 18.3 percent picked two, and 13.2 percent picked three.
The rest (38.9 percent) preferred a full union comprising all five EAC countries.
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The survey questionnaire used to collect the data is available from the authors upon request. Table 4 shows that the respondents were about evenly split on this issue with one-third who agreed or strongly agreed, and another one-third who disagreed or strongly disagreed. The survey also asked the respondents if they agreed with the following statement: Respondents could answer that the situation would improve, deteriorate, remain unchanged, or that they didn't know. Table 4 shows fairly widespread optimism related to the EAMU with 49.7 percent of the respondents expecting an improvement in the economic situation of the average Kenyan and 45.8 percent expecting an improvement in their own personal economic situation.
IV. Methodology
Our first consideration is to assess the likelihood that a respondent is in favor of implementing a monetary union, i.e., that a respondent select at least one country with which Kenya should join in a monetary union: A number of socioeconomic factors were also included. The direction of the effect of Education (1 for higher education and 0 otherwise) is uncertain as it is likely to promote knowledge about both the costs and benefits of monetary union. Age (entered as age groups) might be associated with weaker support for the union due to lower willingness to take risk while Income (also entered as income groups) may raise support for the union to achieve greater financial stability. A gender variable, Gender (1 for male) may be associated with greater support for the monetary union as female respondents may enjoy 3 See Appendices A1 and A2 for variable definitions, summary statistics, and correlations.
(1) As a second step, we assessed whether the pursuit of international clout is associated with a desire for a monetary union of greater size. In principle, larger blocs could project more power. We use an ordered Probit model with robust standard errors and three ordinal dependent variables: Union Size (no union, partial union, and full union), Incremental Union Size (from no union to full union, with one country increment), and Tanzania/Uganda (no union, only Tanzania and Uganda, full union). Again, our primary explanatory variable of interest is EAMU Taken Seriously.
Third, we examined the likelihood of a specific country being picked for inclusion in an EAMU, again using a binary Probit model with robust standard errors. Four empirical models were estimated, one for each country We were interested in whether the coefficient estimate on EAMU Taken Seriously had the same magnitude and statistical significance for each of the potential union members. Table 5 shows the estimations of Equation (1) Next, in Table 6 we report the results of the ordered Probit estimations using Union Size, Incremental Union Size, and Tanzania/Uganda as dependent variables to investigate whether gaining international clout is seen to require a larger union with more members. The findings confirm that EAMU Taken Seriously is positive and significant in all models: a larger union is a vehicle for greater international importance. jei (Note) Three ordinal dependent variables:Union Size (no union, partial union, and full union), Incremental Union Size (form no union to full union), and Tanzania/Uganda (no union, only Tanzania and Uganda, full union). Union Size: 0 = no monetary union, 1 = partial monetary union (whether one, or two or three other countries are picked to join Kenya in a monetary union), 2 = full monetary union. Incremental Union Size: 0 = no union, 1 = one country picked to join Kenya to form a union of two, 2 = union of three, 4 = union of four, and 5 = full union. Tanzania/ Uganda: 0 = no union, 1 = Kenya in a partial union with Tanzania and Uganda, and 2 = full union. Age: reference group is 18yrs.-25yrs. Income: reference group is < 25000 Ksh. Robust standard errors shown in parentheses. ***, **, * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 0% level, respectively.
(2)
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V. Results

Union Size
Incremental Union Size Tanzania for each of the four countries considered for inclusion in a monetary union with Kenya. Column 1 shows the factors determining the choice of Tanzania as a member of the union. Similarly, columns 2, 3, and 4 consider the support for Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi, respectively. The coefficient on the clout variable, EAMU Taken Seriously, is positive and statistically significant in all cases implying that those who strongly agree or agree that the world will take Kenya and the EAC more seriously if they join in a monetary union are more likely to pick a country to join in EAMU. However, the magnitude of the coefficients declines from 0.796 (for Tanzania) to 0.218 (Burundi).
Furthermore, the coefficient for Burundi is significant at the 10% level only compared to the coefficients for the other countries, which are significant at the 1% level. This suggests that the effect of the clout variable on the likelihood of a country being picked is not necessarily similar across the EAC countries. In short, while a union is desirable for the purposes of gaining international clout and a larger union is preferred for that purpose, not all potential member countries are favored equally.
Note that in Table 6 and in Table 7 , as in Table 5 
VI. Conclusion
We employed unique survey data from Kenya to show that gaining greater international power is a motivating factor in pursuing monetary unification in East Africa. Several studies has shown that small states form regional blocs for that purpose, but they have not provided direct evidence that the public We also show that Kenyans are not indifferent about which other countries will enter the union. While Tanzania and Uganda are clearly favored, Rwanda and, particularly, Burundi seem to raise concerns. Hence, in addition to setting economic convergence criteria to be met by member countries, it appears sensible to include political stability criteria as well. Nonetheless, it is worth reiterating that these are results of public perception from one member country alone. It is recommended to extend the study to assess the public's perception from the other EAC member countries, too. (Note) * indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent level.
